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Abstract. A local agglomeration of cooperators can support the survival or spreading of cooperation,
even when cooperation is predicted to die out according to the replicator equation, which is often used
in evolutionary game theory to study the spreading and disappearance of strategies. In this paper, it
is shown that success-driven motion can trigger such local agglomeration and may, therefore, be used
to supplement other mechanisms supporting cooperation, like reputation or punishment. Success-driven
motion is formulated here as a function of the game-theoretical payoffs. It can change the outcome and
dynamics of spatial games dramatically, in particular as it causes attractive or repulsive interaction forces.
These forces act when the spatial distributions of strategies are inhomogeneous. However, even when
starting with homogeneous initial conditions, small perturbations can trigger large inhomogeneities by
a pattern-formation instability, when certain conditions are fulfilled. Here, these instability conditions
are studied for the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that
asymmetrical diffusion can drive social, economic, and biological systems into the unstable regime, if these
would be stable without diffusion.
PACS. 02.50.Le Decision theory and game theory – 87.23.Ge Dynamics of social systems – 82.40.Ck
Pattern formation in reactions with diffusion, flow and heat transfer – 87.23.Cc Population dynamics and
ecological pattern formation
1 Introduction
Game theory is a well-established theory of individual
strategic interactions with applications in sociology, eco-
nomics, and biology [1,2,3,4,5,6], and with many publica-
tions even in physics (see Ref. [7] for an overview). It dis-
tinguishes different behaviors, so-called strategies i, and
expresses the interactions of individuals in terms of pay-
offs Pij . The value Pij quantifies the result of an interac-
tion between strategies i and j for the individual pursuing
strategy i. The more favorable the outcome of the inter-
action, the higher is the payoff Pij .
There are many different games, depending on the
structure of the payoffs, the social interaction network,
the number of interaction partners, the frequency of in-
teraction, and so on [4,5]. Theoretical predictions for the
selection of strategies mostly assume a rational choice ap-
proach, i.e. a payoff maximization by the individuals, al-
though experimental studies [8,9,10] support conditional
cooperativity [11] and show that moral sentiments [12] can
support cooperation. Some models also take into account
learning (see, e.g. [13] and references therein), where it
is common to assume that more successful behaviors are
imitated (copied). Based on a suitable specification of the
imitation rules, it can be shown [14,15,16] that the result-
ing dynamics can be described by game-dynamical equa-
tions [17,18], which agree with replicator equations for the
fitness-dependent reproduction of individuals in biology
[19,20,21].
Another field where the quantification of human be-
havior in terms of mathematical models has been ex-
tremely successful concerns the dynamics of pedestrians
[22], crowds [23], and traffic [24]. The related studies have
led to fundamental insights into observed self-organization
phenomena such as stop-and-go waves [24] or lanes of
uniform walking direction [22]. In the meantime, there
are many empirical [25] and experimental results [26,27],
which made it possible to come up with well calibrated
models of human motion [28,29].
Therefore, it would be interesting to know what hap-
pens if game theoretical models are combined with models
of driven motion. Would we also observe self-organization
phenonomena in space and time? This is the main question
addressed in this paper. Under keywords such as “assort-
ment” and “network reciprocity”, it has been discussed
that the clustering of cooperators can amplify coopera-
tion, in particular in the prisoner’s dilemma [30,31,32,33].
Therefore, the pattern formation instability is of prime
importance to understand the emergence of cooperation
between individuals. In Sec. 4, we will study the in-
stability conditions for the prisoner’s dilemma and the
snowdrift game. Moreover, we will see that games with
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success-driven motion and asymmetrical diffusion may
show pattern formation, where a homogeneous distribu-
tion of strategies would be stable without the presence
of diffusion. It is quite surprising that sources of noise
like diffusion can support the self-organization in systems,
which can be described by game-dynamical equations with
success-driven motion. This includes social, economic, and
biological systems.
We now proceed as follows: In Sec. 2, we introduce
the game-dynamical replicator equation for the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD) and the snow-drift game (SD). In partic-
ularly, we discuss the stationary solutions and their sta-
bility, with the conclusion that cooperation is expected
to disappear in the prisoner’s dilemma. In Sec. 3, we ex-
tend the game-dynamical equation by the consideration
of spatial interactions, success-driven motion, and diffu-
sion. Section 3.1 compares the resulting equations with
reaction-diffusion-advection equations and discusses the
similarities and differences with Turing instabilities and
differential flow-induced chemical instabilities (DIFICI).
Afterwards, Sec. 4 analyzes the pattern formation insta-
bility for the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game
with its interesting implications, while details of the insta-
bility analysis are provided in Appendix B. Finally, Sec.
5 studies the driving forces of the dynamics in cases of
large deviations from stationary and homogeneous strat-
egy distributions, before Sec. 6 summarizes the paper and
presents an outlook.
2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma without Spatial
Interactions
In order to grasp the major impact of success-driven mo-
tion and diffusion on the dynamics of games (see Sec. 3),
it is useful to investigate first the game-dynamical equa-
tions without spatial interactions. For this, we represent
the proportion of individuals using a strategy i at time t by
pi(t). While the discussion can be extended to any num-
ber of strategies, we will focus on the case of two strategies
only for the sake of analytical tractability. Here, i = 1 shall
correspond to the cooperative strategy, i = 2 to defection
(cheating or free-riding). According to the definition of
probabilities, we have 0 ≤ pi(t) ≤ 1 for i ∈ {1, 2} and the
normalization condition
p1(t) + p2(t) = 1 . (1)
Let Pij be the payoff, if strategy i meets strategy j. Then,
the expected payoff for someone applying strategy i is
Ei(t) =
2∑
j=1
Pijpj(t) , (2)
as pj(t) represents the proportion of strategy j, with which
the payoffs Pij must be weighted. The average payoff in
the population of individuals is
E(t) =
2∑
l=1
El(t)pl(t) =
2∑
l=1
2∑
j=1
pl(t)Pljpj(t) . (3)
In the game-dynamical equations, the temporal increase
dpi(t)/dt of the proportion of individuals using strategy
i is proportional to the number of individuals pursuing
strategy i who may imitate, i.e. basically to pi(t). The
proportionality factor, i.e. the growth rate λ(i, t), is given
by the difference between the expected payoff Ei(t) and
the average payoff E(t):
dpi(t)
dt
= λ(i, t)pi(t) =
[
Ei(t)− E(t)
]
pi(t)
=
( 2∑
j=1
Pijpj(t)−
2∑
l=1
2∑
j=1
pl(t)Pljpj(t)
)
pi(t) . (4)
The equations (4) are known as replicator equations. They
were originally developed in evolutionary biology to de-
scribe the spreading of “fitter” individuals through their
higher reproductive success [19,20,21]. However, the repli-
cator equations were also used in game theory, where
they are called “game-dynamical equations” [17,18]. For
a long time, it was not clear whether or why these equa-
tions could be applied to the frequency pi(t) of behavioral
strategies, but it has been shown that the equations can be
derived from Boltzmann-like equations for imitative pair
interactions of individuals, if “proportional imitation” or
similar imitation rules are assumed [14,15,16].
Note that one may add a mutation term to the right-
hand side of the game-dynamical equations (4). This term
could, for example, be specified as
W2p2(t)−W1p1(t) = rq[1− p1(t)]− r(1− q)p1(t)
= r[q − p1(t)] (5)
for strategy i = 1, and by the negative expression of this
for i = 2. Here, r is the overall mutation rate, W2 = rq the
mutation rate towards cooperation, and W1 = r(1−q) the
mutation rate towards defection [16]. This implementation
reflects spontaneous, random strategy choices due to erro-
neous or exploration behavior and modifies the stationary
solutions.
It can be shown that
2∑
i=1
dpi(t)
dt
= 0 , (6)
so that the normalization condition (1) is fulfilled at all
times t, if it is fulfilled at t = 0. Moreover, the equa-
tion dpi(t)/dt = λpi(t) implies pi(t) ≥ 0 at all times t, if
pi(0) ≥ 0 for all strategies i.
We may now insert the payoffs of the prisoner’s
dilemma, i.e.
P11 = R (“reward”),
P12 = S (“sucker’s payoff”),
P21 = T (“temptation”), and
P22 = P (“payoff”) (7)
with the assumed payoff relationships
T > R > P > S . (8)
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Additionally, one often requires
2R > S + T . (9)
The “reward” R is the payoff for mutual cooperation
and the “punishment” P the payoff for mutual defection,
while T is the “temptation” of unilateral defection, and a
cheated cooperator receives the sucker’s payoff S. While
we have P > S in the prisoner’s dilemma, the snowdrift
game (also known as chicken or hawk-dove game) is char-
acterized by S > P , i.e. it is defined by
T > R > S > P . (10)
Both games are characterized by a temptation to defect
(T > R), while the prisoner’s dilemma has the additional
challenge that there is a high risk to cooperate (S < P ).
This difference has a large influence on the resulting level
p1(t) of cooperation: Inserting the above payoffs into Eq.
(4), one eventually obtains the game-dynamical equation
dp1(t)
dt
= [1− p1(t)]
[−A+Bp1(t)]p1(t) . (11)
This directly follows from Eq. (46) of Appendix A, when
the abbreviations
A = P − S and B = P +R− S − T (12)
are used to pronounce the equation’s structure. Setting
dp1(t)/dt = 0, one obviously finds three stationary solu-
tions p1(t) = pk1 , namely
p11 = 0 , p
2
1 = 1 and p
3
1 =
A
B
. (13)
Not all of these solutions are stable with respect to small
deviations. In fact, a linear stability analysis (see Ap-
pendix A) delivers the eigenvalues
λ1 = −A, λ2 = A−B, and λ3 = A
(
1− A
B
)
.
(14)
The stationary solution pk1 is stable with respect to per-
turbations (i.e. small deviations from them), if λk ≤ 0,
while for λk > 0, the deviation will grow in time. Due to
A−B = T −R > 0 , (15)
the solution p21 = 1 corresponding to 100% cooperators
is unstable with respect to perturbations, i.e. it will not
persist. Moreover, the solution p11 will be stable in the
prisoner’s dilemma because of A = P − S > 0. This cor-
responds to 0% cooperators and 100% defectors, which
agrees with the expected result for the one-shot prisoner’s
dilemma (if individuals decide according to rational choice
theory). In the snowdrift game, however, the stationary
solution p11 = 0 is unstable due to A = P − S < 0, while
the additional stationary solution p31 = A/B < 1 is sta-
ble. Hence, in the snowdrift game with B < A < 0, we
expect the establishment of a fraction A/B of coopera-
tors. For the prisoner’s dilemma, the solution p31 does not
exist, as it does not fall into the range between 0 and
1 that is required from probabilities: If B > 0, we have
p31 = A/B > 1, while p
3
1 = A/B < 0 for B < 0.
In summary, for the prisoner’s dilemma, there is no
evolutionarily stable solution with a finite percentage of
cooperators, if we do not consider spontaneous strategy
mutations (and neglect the effect of spatial correlations
through the applied factorization assumption). According
to the above, cooperation in the PD is essentially expected
to disappear. Strategy mutations, of course, can increase
the stable level p11 of cooperation from zero to a finite
value. Specifically, p11 will assume a value close to zero for
small values of r, while it will converge to q in the limit
r →∞.
In the next section, we will show that
1. when the proportions of cooperators and defectors are
allowed to vary in space, i.e. if the distribution of coop-
erators and defectors is inhomogeneous, the proportion
of cooperators may locally grow,
2. we obtain such a variation in space by success-driven
motion, as it can destabilize a homogeneous distribu-
tion of strategies, which gives rise to spatial pattern
formation in the population (agglomeration or segre-
gation or both [49]).
Together with the well-known fact that a clustering of co-
operators can promote cooperation [30,31,32,33], pattern
formation can potentially amplify the level of cooperation,
as was demonstrated numerically for a somewhat related
model in Ref. [34].1 We will also show that, in contrast
to success-driven motion, random motion (“diffusion” in
space) stabilizes the stationary solution p11 with 0% coop-
erators (or, in the presence of strategy mutations, with a
small percentage of cooperators).
3 Taking into Account Success-Driven
Motion and Diffusion in Space
We now assume that individuals are distributed over dif-
ferent locations x ∈ [0, L] of a one-dimensional space. A
generalization to multi-dimensional spaces is easily possi-
ble. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the spatial
variable x is scaled by the spatial extension L, so that x is
dimensionless and varies between 0 and 1. In the follow-
ing, the proportion of individuals using strategy i at time
t and at a location between x and x + dx is represented
by pi(x, t)dx with pi(x, t) ≥ 0. Due to the spatial degrees
1 In contrast to this EPJB paper, the one published in Ad-
vances in Complex Systems (ACS) studies the dynamics in
a two-dimensional grid, assuming spatial exclusion (i.e. a cell
can only be occupied once), neglecting effects of noise and dif-
fusion, and choosing the payoffs P = S = 0, which restricts the
results to a degenerate case of the prisoner’s dilemma and the
snowdrift game. Moreover, this EPJB paper focusses on the
pattern formation instability rather than the amplification of
the level of cooperation, formalizes social forces resulting from
success-driven motion, and discusses pattern formation in the
spatial prisoner’s dilemma induced by asymmetrical diffusion.
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of freedom, the proportion of defectors is not immediately
given by the the proportion of cooperators anymore, and
the previous normalization condition p2(t) = 1 − p1(t) is
replaced by the less restrictive condition
2∑
i=1
L∫
0
dx pi(x, t) = 1 . (16)
This allows the fractions of cooperators and defectors to
uncouple locally, i.e. the proportion of cooperators does
not have to decrease anymore by the same amount as the
proportion of defectors increases.
Note that, if ρi(x, t) = pi(x, t)N/L represents the den-
sity of individuals pursuing strategy i at location x and
time t, Eq. (16) can be transferred into the form
2∑
i=1
1∫
0
dx ρi(x, t) =
N
L
= ρ , (17)
where N is the total number of individuals in the system
and ρ their average density.
One may also consider to treat unoccupied space for-
mally like a third strategy i = 0. In this case, however,
the probabilities pi(x, t) in all locations x add up to the
maximum concentration pmax, see Eq. (23). This means
p0(x, t) = pmax − p1(x, t)− p2(x, t) (18)
and
∂p0(x, t)
∂t
= −∂p1(x, t)
∂t
− ∂p2(x, t)
∂t
. (19)
Therefore, p0(x, t) can be eliminated from the system of
equations, because unoccupied space does not interact
with strategies 1 and 2. As a consequence, the dynamics
in spatial games with success-driven motion is different
from the cyclic dynamics in games considering volunteer-
ing [35]: In order to survive invasion attempts by defectors
in the prisoner’s dilemma, one could think that coopera-
tors would seek separated locations, where they would be
“loners”. However, cooperators do not tend to maneuver
themselves into non-interactive states [34]: On the con-
trary: The survival of cooperators rather requires to have
a larger average number of interaction partners than de-
fectors have.
After this introductory discussion, let us now extend
the game-dynamical equations according to
∂pi(x, t)
∂t
=
( 2∑
l=1
pl
2∑
j=1
Pijpj −
2∑
l=1
2∑
j=1
plPljpj
)
pi(x, t)
− ∂
∂x
(
pi(x, t)
∂Ei(x, t)
∂x
)
+Di
∂2pi(x, t)
∂x2
(20)
with the local expected success
Ei(x, t) =
2∑
j=1
Pijpj(x, t) , (21)
compare Eq. (2). The additional sum
∑
l pl had to be in-
troduced for reasons of normalization, as we do not have
p1 + p2 = 1 any longer.2 ∂pi(x, t)/∂t represents the (par-
tial) time derivative. The first term in large brackets on the
right-hand side of Eq. (20) assumes that locally, an imita-
tion of more successful strategies occurs. An extension of
the model to interactions with neighboring locations would
be easily possible. The second term, which depends on
Ei(x, t), describes success-driven motion [36,37]. Finally,
the last term represents diffusion, and Di ≥ 0 are called
diffusion coefficients or diffusivities. These terms can be
generalized to multi-dimensional spaces by replacing the
spatial derivative ∂/∂x by the nabla operator ∇.
The notion of success-driven motion is justified for the
following reason: Comparing the term describing success-
driven motion with a Fokker-Planck equation [38], one can
conclude that it corresponds to a systematic drift with
speed
Vi(x, t) =
∂Ei(x, t)
∂x
. (22)
According to this, individuals move into the direction of
the gradient of the expected payoff, i.e. the direction of
the (greatest) increase of Ei(x, t). In order to take into ac-
count capacity constraints (saturation effects), one could
introduce a prefactor
C(x, t) = 1−
2∑
l=1
pl(x, t)N
ρmaxL
≥ 0 , (23)
where ρmax = pmaxN/L ≥ N/L > 0 represents the maxi-
mum density of individuals. This would have to be done
in the imitation-based replicator terms in the first line of
Eq. (20) as well. In the following, however, we will focus
on the case C = 1, which allows for a local accumulation
of individuals.
The last term in Eq. (20) is a diffusion term which re-
flects effects of random motion in space [38]. It can be eas-
ily seen that, for Di > 0, the diffusion term has a smooth-
ing effect: It eventually reduces the proportion pi(x, t) in
places x where the second spatial derivative ∂2pi/∂x2 is
negative, in particular in places x where the distribution
pi(x, t) has maxima in space. In contrast, the proportion
pi(x, t) increases in time, where ∂2pi/∂x2 > 0, e.g. where
the distribution has its minima. Assuming an additional
smoothing term
D0
∂4pi(x, t)
∂x4
(24)
2 Rather than multiplying the first sum over j in Eq. (20) by∑
l
pl, one could also divide the second sum over j by
∑
l
pl,
corresponding to a subtraction of the average expected suc-
cess
∑
l
plEl/
∑
l
pl from the expected success Ei. The alter-
native specification chosen here assumes that the number of
strategic game-theoretical interactions of an individual per unit
time is proportional to the number of individuals it may inter-
act with, i.e. proportional to
∑
l
pl(x, t). Both specifications
are consistent with the game-dynamical equation (4), where∑
l
pl(t) = 1.
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with a small constant D0 > 0 on the right-hand side of
Eq. (20) makes the numerical solution of this model well-
behaved (see Appendix B).
When Eq. (20) is solved, one may, for example, assume
periodic boundary conditions (i.e. a circular space). In
this case, we have pi(1, t) = pi(0, t) and ∂kpi(1, t)/∂xk =
∂kpi(0, t)/∂xk, and by means of partial integration, it can
be shown that
∂
∂t
2∑
i=1
1∫
0
dx pi(x, t) = 0 . (25)
Therefore, Eq. (20) fulfils the normalization condition (16)
at all times, if it is satisfied at t = 0. Furthermore, it can
be shown that pi(x, t) ≥ 0 for all times t, if this is true at
time t = 0 for all strategies i and locations x.
3.1 Comparison with Reaction-Diffusion-Advection
Equations
It is noteworthy that the extended game-dynamical model
(20) has some similarity with reaction-diffusion-advection
(RDA) equations. These equations have been developed to
describe the dynamics of chemical reactions with spatial
gradients, considering the effects of differential flows and
diffusion. Specifically, the kinetics of (binary) chemical re-
actions is reflected by non-linear terms similar to those in
the first line on the right-hand side of Eq. (20). The first
term in the second line represents advection terms (dif-
ferential flows), while the last term of Eq. (20) delineates
diffusion effects.
Considering this apparent similarity, what dynamics
do we expect? It is known that reaction-diffusion equa-
tions can show a Turing instability [39,40] (also without
an advection term). Specifically, for a chemical activator-
inhibitor system, one can find a linearly unstable dynam-
ics, if the diffusivities D1 and D2 are different. As a con-
sequence, the concentration of chemicals in space will be
non-homogeneous. This effect has been used to explain
pattern formation processes in morphogenesis [41,42]. Be-
sides the Turing instability, a second pattern-forming in-
stability can occur when chemical reactions are coupled
with differential flows. These so-called “differential flow-
induced chemical instabilities” (DIFICI) can occur even
for equal or vanishing diffusivities Di = D, but they may
also interact with the Turing instability [43,44,45,46,47].
The difference of the extended game-dynamical equa-
tion (20) as compared to the RDA equations lies in the
specification of the velocity Vi(x, t), which is determined
by the gradient of the expected success Ei(x, t). There-
fore, the advective term is self-generated by the success
of the players. We may rewrite the corresponding term in
Eq. (20) as follows:
− ∂
∂x
(
pi
∂Ei
∂x
)
= −
2∑
j=1
Pij
∂pi
∂x
∂pj
∂x
−
2∑
j=1
piPij
∂2pj
∂x2
.
(26)
According to the last term of this equation, the advec-
tion term related to success-driven motion implies effects
similar to a diffusion term with negative diffusion coef-
ficients piPij (if Pij > 0). Additionally, there is a non-
linear dependence on the gradients ∂pi/∂x and ∂pj/∂x of
the strategy distributions in space. Both terms couple the
dynamics of different strategies j.
As a consequence of this, the resulting instability con-
ditions and dynamics are different from the RDA equa-
tions. We will show that, without success-driven mo-
tion, diffusion cannot trigger pattern formation. Diffusion
rather counteracts spatial inhomogeneities. Success-driven
motion, in contrast, causes pattern formation in a large
area of the parameter space of payoffs, partly because of
a negative diffusion effect.
Besides this, we will show that different diffusivities Di
may trigger a pattern formation instability in case of pay-
off parameters, for which success-driven motion does not
destabilize homogeneous strategy distributions in the ab-
sence of diffusion. This counter-intuitive effect reminds of
the Turing instability, although the underlying mathemat-
ical model is different, as pointed out before. In particular,
the largest growth rate does not occur for finite wave num-
bers, as Appendix B shows. The instability for asymmetric
diffusion is rather related to the problem of “noise-induced
transitions” in systems with multiplicative noise, which
are characterized by space-dependent diffusion coefficients
[48]. A further interesting aspect of success-driven motion
is the circumstance that the space-dependent diffusion ef-
fects go back to binary interactions, as the multiplicative
dependence on pi and pj shows.
4 Linear Instability of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and the Snowdrift Game
After inserting the payoffs (7) of the prisoner’s dilemma
and the snowdrift game into Eq. (20), one can see the
favorable effect on the spreading of cooperation that the
spatial dependence, in particular the relaxed normaliza-
tion condition (16) can have: For i = 1, Eq. (20) becomes
∂p1(x, t)
∂t
= p2
[
(R− T )p1 + (S − P )p2
]
p1
+
∂
∂x
[
(D1 − p1R)∂p1
∂x
− p1S ∂p2
∂x
]
. (27)
It is now an interesting question, whether the agglomer-
ation of cooperators can be supported by success-driven
motion. In fact, the second line of Eq. (27) can be rewrit-
ten as
(D1 − p1R)∂
2p1
∂x2
−R
(
∂p1
∂x
)2
− p1S ∂
2p2
∂x2
− S ∂p1
∂x
∂p2
∂x
.
(28)
This shows that a curvature ∂2pi/∂x2 < 0 can support the
increase of the proportion of strategy i as compared to the
game-dynamical equation (4) without spatial dependence.
The situation becomes even clearer, if a linear stability
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analysis of Eqs. (27) is performed (see Appendix B). The
result is as follows: If the square of the wave number κ,
which relates to the curvature of the strategy distribution,
is large enough (i.e. if the related cluster size is sufficiently
small), the replicator terms in the first line on the right-
hand side of equation (20) become negligible. Therefore,
the conditions, under which homogeneous initial strategy
distributions p0i are linearly unstable, simplify to
p01R+ p
0
2P > D1 +D2 (29)
and
(p01R−D1)(p02P −D2) < p01p02ST , (30)
see Eqs. (74) and (75).3
If condition (29) or condition (30) is fulfilled, we ex-
pect emergent spatio-temporal pattern formation, basi-
cally agglomeration or segregation or both [49]. As has
been pointed out before, the agglomeration of cooperators
can increase the level of cooperation. This effect is not pos-
sible, when spatial interactions are neglected. In that case,
we stay with Eq. (11), and the favorable pattern-formation
effect cannot occur.
Let us now discuss a variety of different cases:
1. In case of diffusive motion only (i.e. no success-driven
motion), Eq. (29) must be replaced by
0 > D1 +D2 (31)
and Eq. (30) by
D1D2 < 0 , (32)
which cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, diffusion without
success-driven motion does not support pattern forma-
tion or a related increase in the level of cooperation.
2. In the case of success-driven motion with finite diffu-
sion, Eqs. (29) and (30) imply
p01R+ (1− p01)P > D1 +D2 (33)
and
(p01R−D1)
[
(1− p01)P −D2
]
< p01(1− p01)ST , (34)
if the normalization condition p02 = 1 − p01 for a
homogeneous initial condition is taken into account.
These instability conditions hold for both, the pris-
oner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. Inequality
(33) basically says that, in order to find spontaneous
pattern formation, the agglomerative tendencyR of co-
operators or the agglomerative tendency P of defectors
(or both) must be larger than the diffusive tendency.
This agglomeration, of course, requires the reward R
3 This instability condition has been studied in the context
of success-driven motion without imitation and for games with
symmetrical payoff matrices (i.e. Pij = Pji), which show a
particular behavior [49]. Over here, in contrast, we investigate
continuous spatial games involving imitation (selection of more
successful strategies), and focus on asymmetrical games such
as the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game (see Sec. 4),
which behave very differently.
of cooperation to be positive, otherwise cooperators
would not like to stay in the same location. The al-
ternative instability condition (34) requires that the
product RP of the payoffs resulting when individuals
of the same strategy meet each other is smaller than
the product ST of payoffs resulting when individuals
with different strategies meet each other. This basi-
cally excludes a coexistence of the two strategies in the
same location and is expected to cause segregation. It
is noteworthy that condition (34) is not invariant with
respect to shifts of all payoffs Pij by a constant value
c, in contrast to the replicator equations (46).
3. In case of the prisoner’s dilemma without strategy
mutations, the stable stationary solution for the case
without spontaneous strategy changes is p01 = p
1
1 = 0.
This simplifies the instability conditions further, yield-
ing
P > D1 +D2 (35)
and
−D1(P −D2) < 0 . (36)
In order to fulfil one of these conditions, the punish-
ment P must be positive and larger than D2 to support
pattern formation (here: an aggregation of defectors).
Naturally, the survival or spreading of cooperators re-
quires the initial existence of a finite proportion p01 > 0
of them, see the previous case.
4. In the special case P = S = 0 [34], Eqs. (33) and (34)
become
p01R > D1 +D2 (37)
and
− (p01R−D1)D2 < 0 , (38)
which requires p01R > D1. Therefore, a finite initial
proportion p01 of cooperators is needed again for pat-
tern formation (an agglomeration of cooperators). This
can be easily reached by spontaneous strategy changes.
5. Neglecting diffusion for a moment (i.e. setting D1 =
D2 = 0), no pattern formation should occur, if the
condition
RP > ST (39)
and, at the same time,
p01R+ (1− p01)P < 0 (40)
is fulfilled. Equation (39) implies the stability condi-
tion
S <
RP
T
. (41)
Besides T > R, we have to consider here that S < P
in the prisoner’s dilemma and S > P in the snowdrift
game (see Fig. 1).4
4 Strictly speaking, we also need to take into account Eq.
(40), which implies P < 0 for the stationary solution p01 = p
1
1 =
0 of the prisoner’s dilemma and generally P < −p01R/(1− p01).
In case of the snowdrift game [50], it is adequate to insert the
stationary solution p01 = p
3
1 = A/B, which is stable in case
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6. Finally, let us assume that the stability conditions
ST −RP < 0 and p01R+(1−p01)P < 0 for the previous
case without diffusion (D1 = D2 = 0) are fulfilled, so
that no patterns will emerge. Then, depending on the
parameter values, the instability condition following
from Eq. (34),
−(D1 −D2) (1− p01)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
P
< D2︸︷︷︸
≥0
[p01R+ (1− p01)P ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−D1D2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+ p01(1− p01)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(ST −RP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
, (42)
may still be matched, if (D1−D2) is sufficiently large.
Therefore, aymmetrical diffusion (D1 6= D2) can trig-
ger a pattern formation instability, where the spatio-
temporal strategy distribution without diffusion would
be stable. The situation is clearly different for symmet-
rical diffusion with D1 = D2, which cannot support
pattern formation.
Although the instability due to asymmetrical diffusion
reminds of the Turing instability, it must be distin-
guished from it (see Sec. 3.1). So, how can the insta-
bility then be explained? The reason for it may be
imagined as follows: In order to survive and spread, co-
operators need to be able to agglomerate locally and
to invade new locations. While the first requirement
is supported by success-driven motion, the last one is
promoted by a larger diffusivity D1 > D2 of coopera-
tors.
5 Social Forces in Spatial Games with
Success-Driven Motion
In the previous section, we have shown how success-driven
motion destabilizes homogeneous strategy distributions in
space. This analysis was based on the study of linear
(in)stability (see Appendix B). But what happens, when
the deviation from the homogeneous strategy distribution
is large, i.e. the gradients ∂pi/∂x are not negligible any
longer? This can be answered by writing Eq. (22) explic-
itly, which becomes
Vi(x, t) =
2∑
j=1
Pij
∂pj(x, t)
∂x
=
2∑
j=1
fij(x, t) . (43)
of no spatial interactions. This leads to the condition P <
−p31R/(1− p31) = AR/(A−B) = (P −S)R/(T −R), i.e. SR <
(2R−T )P . The question is, whether this condition will reduce
the previously determined area of stability given by S < RP/T
with P < 0, see Eq. (41) and Fig. 1. This would be the case,
if (2 − T/R)P > RP/T , which by multiplication with RT/P
becomes (2RT−T 2) > R2 or (T−R)2 < 0. Since this condition
cannot be fulfilled, it does not impose any further restrictions
on the stability area in the snowdrift game.
Fig. 1. Payoff-dependence of pattern-formation in the pris-
oner’s dilemma with S < P and the snowdrift game with
S > P according to a linear stability analysis for spatial games
with success-driven motion, but no diffusion, strategy muta-
tions, or noise. One can clearly see that spontaneous pattern-
formation prevails (green area), and that there is only a small
area for P < 0 (marked red), where a homogeneous initial
condition is stable with respect to small perturbations.
Here, the expression
fij(x, t) = Pij
∂pj(x, t)
∂x
(44)
(which can be extended by saturation effects), may be in-
terpreted as interaction force (“social force”) excerted by
individuals using strategy j on an individual using strat-
egy i.5 It is visible that the sign of Pij determines the
character of the force. The force is attractive for posi-
tive payoffs Pij > 0 and repulsive for negative payoffs
Pij < 0. The direction of the force, however, is determined
by spatial changes ∂pj(x, t)/∂x in the strategy distribu-
tion pj(x, t) (i.e. not by the strategy distribution itself).
It is not the size of the payoffs Pij which determines
the strength of the interaction force, but the payoff times
the gradient of the distribution of the strategy j one in-
teracts with (and the availability and reachability of more
favorable neighboring locations, if the saturation prefactor
5 Note that this identification of a speed with a force is some-
times used for dissipative motion of the kind mαd
2xα/dt
2 =
−γαdxα/dt+
∑
β
Fαβ(t), where xα(t) is the location of an in-
dividual α, the “mass” mα reflects inertia, γα is a friction co-
efficient, and Fαβ(t) are interaction forces. In the limiting case
mα → 0, we can make the adiabatic approximation dxα/dt =∑
β
Fαβ(t)/γα =
∑
β
fαβ(t), where dxα/dt is a speed and
fαβ(t) are proportional to the interaction forces Fαβ(t). Hence,
the quantities fαβ(t) are sometimes called “forces” themselves.
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C is taken into account). Due to the dependence on the
gradient ∂pj(x, t)/∂x, the impact of a dispersed strategy
j on individuals using strategy i is negligible. This partic-
ularly applies to scenarios with negative self-interactions
(Pjj < 0).
Note that success-driven motion may be caused by re-
pulsion away from the current location or by attraction
towards more favorable neighborhoods. In the prisoner’s
dilemma, for example, cooperators and defectors feel a
strong attraction towards areas with a higher proportion
of cooperators. However, cooperators seek each other mu-
tually, while the attraction between defectors and cooper-
ators is weaker. This is due to T + S < 2R, see inequality
(9). As a result, even if P > 0, cooperators are moving
away from defectors due to R > P in order to find more
cooperative locations, while defectors are following them.
Another interesting case is the game with the payoffs
P11 = P22 = −P and P12 = P21 = Q > P , where we have
negative self-interactions among identical strategies and
positive interactions between different strategies. Simula-
tions for the no-imitation case show that, despite of the
dispersive tendency of each strategy, strategies tend to ag-
glomerate in certain locations thanks to the stronger at-
tractive interactions between different strategies (see Fig.
3 in Ref. [37]).
The idea of social forces is long-standing. Montroll
used the term to explain logistic growth laws [51], and
Lewin introduced the concept of social fields to the so-
cial sciences in analogy to electrical fields in physics [52].
However, a formalization of a widely applicable social force
concept was missing for a long time. In the meantime, so-
cial forces were successfully used to describe the dynamics
of interacting vehicles [24] or pedestrians [22], but there,
the attractive or repulsive nature was just assumed. At-
tempts to systematically derive social forces from an un-
derlying decision mechanism were based on direct pair in-
teractions in behavioral spaces (e.g. opinion spaces), with
the observation that imitative interactions or the readi-
ness for compromises had attrative effects [16,53]. Here,
for the first time, we present a formulation of social forces
in game-theoretical terms. Considering the great variety of
different games, depending on the respective specification
of the payoffs Pij , this is expected to find a wide range
of applications, in particular as success-driven motion has
been found to produce interesting and relevant pattern
formation phenomena [37,34].
6 Summary, Discussion, and Outlook
In this paper, we have started from the game-dynamical
equations (replicator equation), which can be derived from
imitative pair interactions between individuals [14,15]. It
has been shown that no cooperation is expected in the
prisoner’s dilemma, if no spontaneous strategy mutations
are taken into account, otherwise there will be a signifi-
cant, but usually low level of cooperation. In the snowdrift
game, in contrast, the stationary solution corresponding
to no cooperation is unstable, and there is a stable solution
with a finite level of cooperation.
These considerations have been carried out to illus-
trate the major difference that the introduction of spa-
tial interactions based on success-driven motion and dif-
fusion makes. While diffusion itself tends to support ho-
mogeneous strategy distributions rather than pattern for-
mation, success-driven motion implies an unstable spatio-
temporal dynamics under a wide range of conditions. As
a consequence, small fluctations can destabilize a homo-
geneous distribution of strategies. Under such conditions,
the formation of emergent patterns (agglomeration, segre-
gation, or both) is expected. The resulting dynamics may
be understood in terms of social forces, which have been
formulated here in game-theoretical terms.
The destabilization of homogeneous strategy distribu-
tions and the related occurence of spontaneous pattern
formation has, for example, a great importance for the
survival and spreading of cooperators in the prisoner’s
dilemma. While this has been studied numerically in the
past [34], future work based on the model of this paper and
extensions of it shall analytically study conditions for the
promotion of cooperation. For example, it will be interest-
ing to investigate, how relevant the imitation of strategies
in neighboring locations is, how important is the rate of
strategy changes as compared to location changes, and
how crucial is a territorial effect (i.e. a limitation pmax of
the local concentration of individuals, which may protect
cooperators from invasion by defectors).
Of course, instead of studying the continuous game-
dynamical model with success-driven motion and calculat-
ing its instability conditions, one can also perform agent-
based simulations for a discretized version of the model.
For the case without imitation of superior strategies and
symmetrical payoffs (Pij = Pji), it has been shown that
the analytical instability conditions surprisingly well pre-
dict the parameter areas of the agent-based model, where
pattern-formation takes place [49]. Despite the difference
in the previously studied model (see footnote 2), this is
also expected to be true for the non-symmetrical games
studied here, in particular as we found that the influence
of imitation on the instability condition is negligible, if
the wave number κ characterizing inhomogeneities in the
initial distribution is large. This simplified the stability
analysis a lot. Moreover, it was shown that asymmetri-
cal diffusion can drive our game-theoretical model with
success-driven motion from the stable regime into the un-
stable regime. While this reminds of the Turing insta-
bility [39], it is actually different from it: Compared to
reaction-diffusion-advection equations, the equations un-
derlying the game-dynamical model with success-driven
motion belong to another mathematical class, as is elabo-
rated in Sec. 3.1.
In Sec. 5, it was pointed out that, in the prisoner’s
dilemma, cooperators evade defectors, who seek cooper-
ators. Therefore, some effects of success-driven motion
(leaving unfavorable neighborhoods) may be interpreted
as punishment of the previous interaction partners, who
are left behind with a lower overall payoff. However,
“movement punishment” of defectors by leaving unfavor-
able environments is different from the “costly” or “altru-
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istic punishment” discussed in the literature [54]: In the
strict sense, success-driven motion neither imposes costs
on a moving individual nor on the previous interaction
partners. If we would introduce a cost of movement, it
would have to be paid by both, cooperators who evade de-
fectors, and defectors who follow them. Therefore, costly
motion would be expected to yield similar results as be-
fore, but it would still be different from altruistic punish-
ment. It should also be pronounced that, besides avoid-
ing unfavorable locations, success-driven motion implies
the seeking of favorable environments, which has nothing
to do with punishment. Without this element, e.g. when
individuals leave unfavorable locations based on a ran-
dom, diffusive motion, success-driven motion is not effec-
tive in promoting cooperation. Therefore, the mechanism
of success-driven motion, despite some similar features, is
clearly to be distinguished from the mechanism of punish-
ment.
Finally, note that migration may be considered as one
realization of success-driven motion. Before, the statistics
of migration behavior was modeled by the gravity law
[55,56] or entropy approaches [57,58], while its dynamics
was described by partial differential equations [59,60] and
models from statistical physics [61]. The particular poten-
tial of the approach proposed in this paper lies in the inte-
gration of migration into a game-theoretical framework, as
we formalize success-driven motion in terms of payoffs and
strategy distributions in space and time. Such integrated
approaches are needed in the social sciences to allow for
consistent interpretations of empirical findings within a
unified framework.
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A Linear Stability Analysis of the
Game-Dynamical Equation Without Spatial
Interactions
Inserting the payoffs (7) of the prisoner’s dilemma or the
snowdrift game into Eq. (4), we get the game-dynamical
equation
dp1(t)
dt
=
[
Rp1 + Sp2 −R(p1)2
− (S + T )p1p2 − P (p2)2
]
p1(t) . (45)
Considering Eq. (1), i.e. p2(t) = 1− p1(t), we find
dp1
dt
=
[
Rp1 + S(1− p1)−R(p1)2
−(S + T )p1(1− p1)− P (1− p1)2
]
p1(t)
= (1− p1)
[
(S − P ) + (P +R− S − T )p1
]
p1(t) . (46)
This is a mean-value equation, which assumes a factoriza-
tion of joint probabilities, i.e. it neglects correlations [16].
Nevertheless, the following analysis is suited to provide
insights into the dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma and
the snowdrift game. Introducing the useful abbreviations
A = P − S and B = P +R− S − T, (47)
Eq. (46) can be further simplified, and we get
dp1(t)
dt
= [1− p1(t)]
[−A+Bp1(t)]p1(t) . (48)
Obviously, shifting all payoffs Pij by a constant value c
does not change Eq. (11), in contrast to the case involving
spatial interactions discussed later.
Let pk1 with k ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote the stationary solu-
tions (13) of Eq. (11), defined by the requirement dp1/dt =
0. In order to analyze the stability of these solutions with
respect to small deviations
δp1(t) = p1(t)− pk1 , (49)
we perform a linear stability analysis in the following. For
this, we insert Eq. (49) into Eq. 11), which yields
dδp1(t)
dt
= (1− pk1 − δp1)(−A+Bpk1 +B δp1)(pk1 + δp1)
=
[
(1− pk1)pk1 + (1− 2pk1)δp1 − (δp1)2
]
× (−A+Bpk1 +B δp1) . (50)
If we concentrate on sufficiently small deviations δp1(t),
terms containing factors [δp1(t)]m with an integer expo-
nent m > 1 can be considered much smaller than terms
containing a factor δp1(t). Therefore, we may linearize the
above equations by dropping higher-order terms propor-
tionally to [δp1(t)]m with m > 1. This gives
dδp1
dt
=
[
(1− pk1)pk1 + (1− 2pk1)δp1(t)
]
(−A+Bpk1)
+(1− pk1)pk1B δp1(t)
=
[
(1− 2pk1)(−A+Bpk1) + (1− pk1)pk1B
]
δp1(t), (51)
as (1 − pk1)pk1(−A + Bpk1) = 0 for all stationary solutions
pk1 . With the abbreviation
λk = (1− 2pk1)(−A+Bpk1) + (1− pk1)pk1B , (52)
we can write
dδp1(t)
dt
= λk δp1(t) . (53)
If λk < 0, the deviation δp1(t) will exponentially decay
with time, i.e. the solution will converge to the stationary
solution pk1 , which implies its stability. If λk > 0, however,
the deviation will grow in time, and the stationary solution
pk1 is unstable. For the stationary solutions p
1
1 = 0, p
2
1 = 1,
and p31 = A/B given in Eq. (13), we can easily find
λ1 = −A, λ2 = A−B , and λ3 = A
(
1− A
B
)
,
(54)
respectively.
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B Linear Stability Analysis of the Model with
Success-Driven Motion and Diffusion
In order to understand spatio-temporal pattern formation,
it is not enough to formulate the (social) interaction forces
determining the motion of individuals. We also need to
grasp, why spatial patterns can emerge from small per-
turbations, even if the initial distribution of strategies is
uniform (homogeneous) in space.
If Eq. (20) is written explicitly for i = 1, we get
∂p1
∂t
=
[
(p1 + p2)(P11p1 + P12p2)− P11(p1)2
−(P12 + P21)p1p2 − P22(p2)2
]
p1(x, t)
− ∂
∂x
[
p1
(
P11
∂p1
∂x
+ P12
∂p2
∂x
)]
+D1
∂2p1
∂x2
. (55)
The equation for i = 2 looks identical, if only p1(x, t)
and p2(x, t) are exchanged in all places, and the same is
done with the indices 1 and 2. We will now assume a
homogeneous initial condition pi(x, 0) = p0i (i.e. a uni-
form distribution of strategies i in space) and study the
spatio-temporal evolution of the deviations δpi(x, t) =
pi(x, t) − p0i . Let us insert for p01 one of the values pk1 ,
which are stationary solutions of the partial differential
equation (20), as p02 = (1 − p01) holds for homogeneous
strategy distributions due to the normalization condition
(16). Assuming small deviations δpi(x, t) and linearizing
Eq. (55) by neglecting non-linear terms, we obtain
∂δp1
∂t
=
[
(P11 − P21)p01p02 + (P12 − P22)(p02)2
]
δp1
+
[
(P11 − P21)(p01 δp2 + p02 δp1)
+2(P12 − P22)p02 δp2
]
p01
− p01
(
P11
∂2δp1
∂x2
+ P12
∂2δp2
∂x2
)
+D1
∂2δp1
∂x2
. (56)
Again, a mutation term W2δp2(x, t)−W1δp1(x, t) reflect-
ing spontaneous strategy changes may be added, see Eq.
(5). The analogous equation for δp2(x, t) is obtained by
exchanging strategies 1 and 2.
In Eq. (56), it can be easily seen that success-driven
motion with Pij > 0 has a similar functional form, but
the opposite sign as the diffusion term. While the latter
causes a homogenization in space, success-driven motion
can cause local agglomeration [37], first of all for Pij > 0.
It is known that linear partial differential equations
like Eq. (56) are solved by (a superposition of) functions
of the kind
δpi(x, t) = eλ˜t
[
ai cos(κx) + bi sin(κx)
]
, (57)
where ai and bi are initial amplitudes, λ˜ = λ˜(κ) is their
growth rate (if positive, or a decay rate, if negative), and
κ = κn = 2pin/L with n ∈ {1, 2, . . .} are possible “wave
numbers”. The “wave length” 2pi/κ = L/n may be imag-
ined as the extension of a cluster of strategy i in space.
Obviously, possible wave lengths in case of a circular space
of diameter L = 1 are fractions L/n. The general solution
of Eq. (56) is
δpi(x, t) =
∞∑
n=1
eλ˜(κn)t
[
ai,n cos(κnx) + bi,n sin(κnx)
]
,
(58)
i.e. a linear superposition of solutions of the form (57) with
all possible wave numbers κn. For t = 0, the exponential
prefactor eλ˜(κn)t becomes 1, and Eq. (58) may then be
viewed as the Fourier series of the spatial dependence of
the initial condition δp(i, x, 0). Hence, the amplitudes ai,n
and bi,n correspond to the Euler-Fourier coefficients [62].
Let us now determine the possible eigenvalues λ˜(κ).
For the ansatz (57), we have ∂δpi(x, t)/∂t = λ˜δpi(x, t) and
∂2δpi(x, t)/∂x2 = −κ2δpi(x, t). Therefore, the linearized
equations can be cast into the following form of an eigen-
value problem with eigenvalues λ˜:
λ˜
 δp1(x, t)
δp2(x, t)
 =
M11 M12
M21 M22

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=M
 δp1(x, t)
δp2(x, t)
 . (59)
Here, we have introduced the abbreviations
M11 = A11 + (p01P11 −D1)κ2 , (60)
M12 = A12 + p01P12κ
2 , (61)
M21 = A21 + p02P21κ
2 , (62)
M22 = A22 + (p02P22 −D2)κ2 (63)
with
A11 =
[
(P12 − P22)p02 + 2(P11 − P21)p01
]
p02 (64)
A12 =
[
(P11 − P21)p01 + 2(P12 − P22)p02
]
p01 , (65)
A21 =
[
(P22 − P12)p02 + 2(P21 − P11)p01
]
p02 , (66)
A22 =
[
(P21 − P11)p01 + 2(P22 − P12)p02
]
p01 (67)
The eigenvalue problem (59) can only be solved, if the
determinant of the matrix (M − λ˜1) vanishes, where 1 de-
notes the unit matrix [62]. In other words, λ˜ are solutions
of the so-called “characteristic polynomial”
(M11 − λ˜)(M22 − λ˜)−M12M21
= λ˜2 − (M11 +M22)λ˜+M11M22 −M12M21 = 0 . (68)
This polynomial is of degree 2 in λ˜ and has the following
two solutions:
λ˜(κ) =
M11 +M22
2
± 1
2
√
(M11 +M22)2 − 4(M11M22 −M12M21) . (69)
The fastest growing mode (i.e. the value of the wave num-
ber κ with the largest real value Re(λ˜) of λ˜) usually de-
termines the length scale of the emerging patterns. Con-
sidering (60) to (63), we can easily see that the largest
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value of Re(λ˜) is reached in the limit κ→∞. This is due
to the relationship of success-driven motion with negative
diffusion. Hence, the finally resulting distribution would
be a superposition of delta peaks. As this is not favor-
able from a numerical perspective, the smoothing term
(24) may be added, which implies the additional terms
D0κ
4 in Eqs. (60) and (63). These terms imply, in fact,
that Re(λ˜) reaches its maximum value for a finite value of
κ. Note, however, that discrete models involving success-
driven motion also tend to end up with distributions ap-
proximating a superposition of delta peaks [36,37].
When deriving the instability conditions from Eq. (69)
in the following, we will focus on the particularly interest-
ing case, where the mathematical expression under the
root is non-negative (but the case of a negative value if
4M12M21 < −(M11 −M22)2 could, of course, be treated
as well). It can be shown that λ˜ becomes positive, if one
of the following instability conditions is fulfilled:
M11 +M22 > 0 (70)
or
M11M22 < M12M21 . (71)
In this case, we expect the amplitudes of the small de-
viations δpi(x, t) to grow over time, which gives rise to
spatial pattern formation (such as segregation). Inserting
the abbreviations (60) to (63), the instability conditions
become[
A11+(p01P11−D1)κ2
]
+
[
A22+(p02P22−D2)κ2
]
> 0 (72)
and [
A11 + (p01P11 −D1)κ2
][
A22 + (p02P22 −D2)κ2
]
<
(
A12 + p01P12κ
2
)(
A21 + p02P21κ
2
)
. (73)
If κ is large enough (i.e. if the related cluster size is suf-
ficiently small), the instability conditions (72) and (73)
simplify to
p01P11 + p
0
2P22 > D1 +D2 (74)
and
(p01P11 −D1)(p02P22 −D2) < p01P12p02P21 . (75)
These are further discussed in the main text.
